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I. INTRODUCfiON 
In cases governed by state law, federal courts are supposed 
to apply state law consistent with the state courts' elaboration of 
it. So says the Rules of Decision Act-originally section 34 of the 
1789 Judiciary Ad -at least as construed by the modern Su-
preme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.2 Prior to Erie, federal 
courts exercised considerable independence in the interpretation 
and administration of state law. The perceived vice of the deci-
sion that Erie overturned-Swift v. Tyson3 -was its unwilling-
ness to apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by its 
highest court. Erie viewed Swift as holding that the "laws" of the 
several states which the federal courts were bound to apply un-
der section 34 did not include their decisional law "in matters of 
general jurisprudence."4 Modern scholarship, however, has sug-
gested that Swift may have been faithful to early understandings 
that the "general common law" was something apart from state 
law (as well as federal law), and thus not subject to section 34's 
command.5 Still others have suggested that section 34 was itself a 
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1. "(T)he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or stat-
utes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of 
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they 
apply." Act of Sept. 29, 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73. 
2. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. 
5. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1539 
(1984). 
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command to the federal courts to apply an amalgam of "Ameri-
can" common-law principles, as opposed to the common law of 
any particular state.6 
In the search for the earliest judicial elaborations of section 
34, many accounts begin with the Supreme Court's brief (and 
not particularly well known) opinion in Brown v. Van Braam.7 
There, counsel had argued that the "laws" of the several states 
referred to in section 34 included a state's common law as well as 
its statutory law; the Court itself, however, made no reference to 
section 34 in concluding that state law applied to the case before 
it.8 Nevertheless, in an article on which Erie would later rely, 
Charles Warren emphasized this argument of counsel in Van 
Braam as evidence of early understandings of section 34 and the 
role of state law in the federal courts.9 In addition, the leading 
book-length study of the framing of the 1789 statute also treats 
Van Braam as "the first reported civil case citing section 34."10 
And, beginning with its second edition, the Hart & Wechsler 
Federal Courts casebook has commenced its treatment of sec-
tion 34 with a note on Van Braam. 11 Echoing Warren, the editors 
observe that counsel raised a point "of particular interest" when 
he argued that the "laws" of the states included their unwritten 
as well as their written law. 12 William Crosskey's elaborate dis-
cussion of the federal courts and the common law also begins 
with Van Braam, but for various reasons, Crosskey discounts its 
significance for the interpretation of section 34.13 
6. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 
1789, at 83-84; 140--41 (Wythe Holt & Lewis H. LaRue eds., 1990); see also G. EDWARD 
WHITE, 3--4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, 133-34 & n.201 (1988) (finding 
some explanatory force in Ritz's treatment). 
7. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344 (1797). 
8. /d. at 352. For doubts whether Van Braam ultimately relied on section 34, see 
RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON 
LAW 79 (1977). The history of the Van Braam litigation is recounted in 7 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-
1800, at 798-810 (Maeva Marcus, eta!. eds., 2004) (1985). 
9. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 88 n.85 (1923); see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.S, 86 (referring to 
Warren's article). Professor Purcell's treatment of Erie downplays the Court's reliance on 
Warren. See EDWARD PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 
106, 342 n.78 (2000). 
10. RITZ, supra note 6, at 156. 
11. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 623 (5th ed. 2003) (hereinafter HART & 
WECHSLER). 
12. /d. 
13. 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 822 (1953). 
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These traditional accounts, as well as other accounts/4 over-
look an earlier and far more detailed treatment of this provision 
and the problem of choice of law in the federal courts: Justice 
James Iredell's 1795 Circuit Court decision in United States v. 
Mundel/. 15 The decision has managed to fly under the radar of 
most federal courts scholars, despite its thorough discussion of 
the application of section 34 to civil cases and the constitutional 
underpinnings for requiring resort to state law in matters not 
governed by federallaw.16 
In the course of the opinion, as discussed below, Iredell 
reaches a number of important and interrelated conclusions. 
First, he determines that state law, including its common law as 
well as its statute law, should apply in cases governed by section 
34 when federal law is silent. Indeed, Iredell intimates that sec-
tion 34 simply reinforced what would have occurred in federal 
court anyway, given the absence of any supreme federal law to 
displace what he considers to be otherwise applicable state law. 
In this respect, the decision appears to foreshadow the later con-
clusions of Erie. Second, he provides a lengthy analysis of the 
possible sources of the "laws of the several states," and con-
cludes that federal courts should apply the common law of a 
relevant state, as opposed to some amalgam of "American" law 
unrelated to a particular state's state law. Nevertheless, because 
Iredell recognizes that the states had affirmatively adopted and 
adapted a largely similar English common law through various 
reception provisions, his opinion appears to assume that federal 
courts might properly construe and apply this shared or general 
common law in cases before them- but ostensibly as a matter of 
the law of a relevant state. In this respect, Mundell bears more of 
a kinship to Swift by its assumption that federal courts would 
have an interpretive role respecting the general law that was 
held in common by the various states. Finally, Iredell rejects an 
argument in the case before him that, because the underlying 
civil litigation involved the United States as the complaining 
party, a uniform rule of decision should be fashioned to better 
accommodate federal interests. Instead, he concludes that the 
14. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1539. 
15. United States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No. 15,834). 
16. Mundell is rarely cited, and typically not for its bearing on section 34. The Su-
preme Court has twice cited Mundell, each time for its bearing on jury trial rights in ac-
tions for statutory penalties. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 (1987); Hepner 
v. Umted States, 213 U.S. 103, 108 (1909). Counsel once cited Mundell for its bearing on 
section 34. See Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 78 (1884). 
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law of the relevant state should apply absent legislation by Con-
gress. 
In this Essay, I will first address why the decision's treat-
ment of section 34 might have been overlooked, and then I will 
attempt to develop Justice Iredell's constitutional and statutory 
understanding of choice of law in the federal courts. I will then 
sketch Mundell's potential impact on early understandings of the 
Rules of Decision Act and the role of federal courts in the ar-
ticulation and implementation of state law. 
II. THE MUNDELL OPINION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Mundell has probably been neglected because it was a 
criminal case. As such, it might appear to be an unlikely candi-
date for revealing early judicial understandinps of the role of 
state law in civil litigation in the federal courts.1 In fact, in one of 
the very few references to Mundell in connection with section 34, 
Supreme Court historian Julius Goebel treated the decision as 
having "held ... that section 34 applied to criminal trials."18 But 
that characterization is inaccurate. Admittedly, Mundell itself 
involved a federal prosecution. Federal officials had brought an 
indictment in the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia 
against Joseph Mundell for physically resisting and assaulting a 
federal marshal who was serving process on him in connection 
with an earlier civil action brought against Mundell by the 
United States. 19 But the Mundell court's treatment of section 34 
did not directly concern the criminal case before it. Rather, as 
discussed below, the provision was relevant only to the court's 
discussion of the applicable law in the prior civil suit against 
Mundell that gave rise to the criminal proceeding. 
The underlying civil suit upon which the criminal action was 
based was "an action of debt" brought by the United States to 
17. Some argue that section 34 was specifically designed to apply to criminal cases. 
See RITZ, supra note 6, at 98; Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 
LAW & HIST. REV. 267, 296-98 (1986); see also PETER S. DUPONCEAU, A 
DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1824). 
18. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 610 (1971). 
19. See Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112, § 22 (criminalizing obstruction of service 
of process). The writs that the deputy marshal served were writs of capias ad responden-
dum. 
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recover damages and statutory penalties for Mundell's non-
payment of duties and revenues he owed the United States aris-
ing out of his operation of a still.20 Although the earlier action 
was a suit for a penalty, Justice Iredell did not hesitate in label-
ing it a civil suit.21 As discussed in Mundell, the issue in the ear-
lier federal civil proceeding was whether, in an action of debt 
commenced by arrest of the defendant, the serving officer could 
demand bail-failing which, the defendant could be jailed-and 
whether state law supplied the relevant rule on that question. 
Congress had not indicated whether bail could be required in 
civil cases brought by the United States. And if bail was not re-
quired under the relevant law, then-according to Iredell-
failure to gost bail and physical resistance thereafter would not 
be illegal. Thus, the Mundell case addressed the more ordinary 
problem of the role of state law in civil cases in federal courts, 
albeit not in a diversity case, but in a civil suit in which the 
United States was the plaintiff. 
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 34 
With respect to the civil suit, the court saw the question as 
whether "in this case the law of Virginia alone is to be the rule 
by which we are to decide whether bail was demandable or 
not. ... [or], that some general law must be the rule, it not being 
supposable that in a case of this kind congress meant to refer to 
any local laws of the particular states, which might be inapplica-
ble in all their circumstances to the cases of the United States. "23 
Iredell acknowledged that this might be an area in which Con-
gress could legislate directly, by insisting on bail (or jail) in civil 
suits brought by the United States. But he proceeded to note 
that it might be preferable in a new republic, consisting of differ-
ent pre-existing legal systems, "to refer generally to the laws of 
the different states ... as well in cases of general and local con-
20. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. at 25. 
21. ld. at 26 ( "[T]he proceeding in question was not a proceeding in a criminal 
case, ... but was, in truth, a civil suit.") Actually, there were two civil suits: one for non-
payment of duties, and one for a statutory penalty for violation of revenue laws. The 
court observed that because the marshal had insisted on bail for both, it was a sufficient 
defense to the criminal proceeding if bail was improperly required for either. See also 
infra note 37. 
22. /d. at 32 ("(W]e cannot give judgment against the defendant without saying that 
the marshal had a right to require special bail."). Mundell resisted the marshal's effort to 
commit him for nonpayment of bail, not the service of process itself. I d. at 24. 
23. !d. at 27. 
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cern," both to save legislative energy and to accommodate pre-
vailing expectations within the different states.24 
In addition, Iredell rejected the suggestion that the matter 
of bail was covered by federal statutes relating to the practice 
and procedures of the federal courts. "[N]onadmission of bail," 
he said, is a subject "so important, and [one] in which the liber-
ties of the citizens are so concerned that a power merely of di-
recting the practice of the courts cannot justly be extended to a 
case of this kind. "25 Having concluded that he was dealing with a 
rule of decision rather than a rule of practice, Iredell then con-
cluded that a civil action for debt brought by the United States 
involved a trial "at common law" to which section 34 was di-
rected. He rejected the argument that an action on a statute-
here, a federal statute for a penalty-might be something other 
than an action at common law, deciding that the phrase "at 
common law" in this part of section 34 was used merely to dis-
tinguish suits in "admiralty" and actions in "equity."26 
C. "(T]HE LAWS OF THE SEVERAL STATES" 
Iredell then launched into a lengthy treatment of what con-
stituted "the laws" of Virginia-the state whose laws he sup-
posed would apply in a federal civil proceeding arising in that 
state, in the absence of a controlling federal treaty, statute, or 
constitutional provision. He argued that state law would consist 
of all of the pre-existing law that the state had received at earlier 
points in time, along with any modifications thereafter. Thus, at 
the time of its original settlement, the law in the state of Virginia 
("as in others") consisted of English statute law and English 
common law unaltered by statute, "so far as they were applica-
ble to [the state's] situation." At the time of the 1776 Revolu-
tion, however, the statutory law would also have included rele-
vant interim coloniallegislation.27 The latter, Iredell said, was on 
an equal plane with the former, and therefore he thought it pref-
erable to speak of all of this as "the common and statute law of 
Virginia generally than [to] speak of any part of it ... as the 
common and statute law of England. "28 This common and statute 
law of England thus "adopted" as Virginia law was "repealable 
24. /d. 
25. ld. 
26. !d. at 28. 
27. /d. at 29. 
28. ld. 
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in the very same manner as any special act of the Virginia as-
sembly," but it remained a part of state law until altered through 
"the authority of the people" acting either directly or through 
their representatives.29 
Although Iredell does not get into the details of Virginia's 
adoption of English law, it was formally accomplished in a May, 
1776 ordinance which stated that "the common law of England" 
and "general" (but not "local") English statutes made "in aid of 
the common law," as well as colonial legislation "now in 
force ... shall be the rule of decision" until legislatively altered.30 
Interestingly, the language and structure of the reception provi-
sion31 resembles the language and structure of an early draft of 
the 1789 Rules of Decision Act that was famously unearthed by 
Charles Warren. In that draft, "the Statute law of the several 
States in force for the time being and their unwritten or common 
law now in use, whether by adoption from the common law of 
England, the ancient statutes of the same or otherwise," would 
provide the "rules of decision" in federal courts, absent control-
ling federallaw.32 The Virginia reception provision thus dictated 
the common and statute law that would supply the "rule of deci-
sion" for state courts in much the same way that the federal 
"rules of decision" statute dictated the application of the com-
mon and statute laws of each state for federal courts, in cases 
where they applied. 
Iredell went on to argue that events subsequent to this re-
ception, including the Revolution, did not fundamentally alter 
the content of this pre-existing state law, although the new form 
of government it ushered in might mean that some such law was 
no longer applicable to "the new situation of the people. "33 Simi-
larly, the Constitution (and before it, the Articles of Confedera-
29. /d. For similar views of the common law's reception, see Livingston v. Jefferson, 
15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (8,411) (Marshall, Circuit Justice); United States v. 
Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384,394 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (Chase, Circuit Justice). 
30. Ordinances of Virginia Convention [May 1776), 9 HENING'S STATUTES AT 
LARGE, ch. 5, 127 (1821). 
/d. 
31. The full text of the 1776 reception provision reads: 
And be it further ordained that the common law of England, all statutes or acts 
of parliament made in aid of the common law prior to [1607), and which are of a 
general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with the several acts of the 
general assembly of this colony now in force, so far as the same may consist with 
the several ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of the general convention, 
shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until the 
same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony. 
32. See Warren, supra note 9, at 86. 
33. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. at 30. 
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tion) did not fundamentally alter the state's pre-existing law, ex-
cept insofar as it was "plainly inconsistent" with powers trans-
ferred to the federal government. As for powers not surren-
dered, "the laws of the states. . . remained unaltered." 
Furthermore, Iredell suggested that as a constitutional matter, 
pre-existing state law in areas of new federal cognizance would 
also remain in force until such time as federal legislative author-
ity was actually exercised, absent a "manifest inconsistency" with 
the unexercised grant of federal power.34 As an example, Iredell 
offered the area of bankruptcy. Although he supposed that that 
particular grant of federal power was likely exclusive, Iredell 
speculated that it would not pre-empt the operation of pre-
existing state bankruptcy laws unless and until Congress acted. 
He then suggested that the law regarding bail in civil actions 
brought by the United States "is perhaps of this nature." 35 
The discussion of supremacy was central to Iredell's treat-
ment of section 34, because Iredell came close to concluding that 
under the Constitution, state law would usually have operated of 
its own force in federal courts, even without reference to section 
34. "[U]ntil [Congress] made a law concerning such subject, the 
state law in relation to it would have been in force." 36 But given 
section 34's "express reference" to state law as the rule of deci-
sion, Iredell stated that had no doubt about the applicability of 
state law. In this regard, section 34 confirmed what would have 
happened under Iredell's approach to federal supremacy and the 
displacement of state law more generally: State law, which in-
cluded much of English common law, remained the law of the 
land in Virginia (in state and federal courts alike), unless and un-
til displaced by the supreme law of the land. 
On the merits, Iredell concluded that Virginia law-in this 
case a state statute-would not have required bail in a civil ac-
tion of debt for a statutory penalty. As a result, resistance to a 
federal officer seeking to arrest a party for failure to offer bail in 
such an action was lawful. The federal criminal action against 
Mundell was therefore dismissed.37 
34. !d. 
35. !d. 
36. !d. 
37. /d. at 31-32. The court held only that bail was not requirable on the suit seeking 
to recover the statutory penalty for nonpayment of revenues (as opposed to the claim for 
unpaid duties). !d. 
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III. MUNDELL'S SIGNIFICANCE 
A. GENERAL LAW AS STATE LAW 
The opinion in Mundell is important from a number of per-
spectives. First, the treatment of section 34 was necessary to the 
decision in Mundell because the criminal action turned on the 
applicability of state law in the earlier civil action that gave rise 
to it. In addition, Iredell stated (if only in elaborate dicta, given 
his ultimate reliance on a state statute), that a state's "laws" un-
der section 34 would include its common law as well as its statute 
law, just as counsel would later argue in Van Braam. Also, Ire-
dell's constitutional analysis suggests that absent the interven-
tion of positive federal law, state law would ordinarily supply the 
relevant rule of decision in cases brought in federal court. 
More importantly, Iredell seemed to suppose that federal 
courts applying state law under section 34 would apply the law of 
a particular state. Although much of that law would include the 
common law and statute law of England and would be shared 
with other states,38 some would be more peculiarly Virginia's, in-
sofar as it might differ from English law. But both would be ap-
plicable in federal courts in cases in which Virginia law applied. 
By focusing on the reception of the common law in a particular 
state, Iredell articulated a theory by which a broodingly omni-
present version of the common law shared with other states 
could operate within each state as a matter of positive state law. 
This general common law, applicable by statute in individual 
states unless departed from, would therefore also be applicable 
in the federal courts, consistent with section 34 and consistent, 
presumably, with the Constitution.39 
This approach of Iredell's contrasts somewhat with that 
urged by scholars who have maintained that section 34 was a di-
rective to federal courts to apply "American Law"- an amalgam 
of the states' laws-rather than the laws of any particular state.40 
Their focus is on the textual reference in section 34 to the laws of 
"the several states" (supposedly referring to them collectively) 
38. See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United 
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 802-03 (1951) (noting that Virginia's reception provision 
served as the model for many other states). 
39. Cf Larry Kramer, On Finding (and Losing) Our Origins, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 95, 100--02 (2003) (noting that reception of the common law by states made inde-
pendent federal court interpretation of it unproblematic). 
40. See RITZ, supra note 6, at 83--84; 140-41. 
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rather than the laws of "the respective states" (to refer to them 
individually).41 However, the several-versus-respective distinc-
tion went unmentioned by Iredell who assumed the applicability 
of the law of a particular state under section 34. Indeed, Iredell 
went to considerable lengths to explain why federal courts would 
be applying the common law of a particular state under section 
34, even when much of that law might be shared by the other 
states as well.42 
To be sure, the net result of Iredell's approach to choice of 
law in Mundell-in which federal courts would have to construe 
this shared common law in applying a particular state's common 
law-might often parallel the result of focusing on an amalgam 
of states' laws. But the latter focus would seem to disable the 
application of a particular state's law even when the state had 
clearly departed from whatever the amalgam (or "American") 
rule was. In fact, focusing on the supposed distinction between 
the laws of the "several" states versus the "respective" states 
raises doubts whether a federal court could ever apply the law of 
the state in which it sits-including its statutory law-unless it 
conformed to the general rule. By contrast, Iredell's approach 
not only expressly preserved the possibility of legislative change 
within a state, but as discussed below, it arguably preserved the 
possibility (narrow though it might be) that a state's courts could 
depart from the general common law in a way that federal courts 
would ultimately have to respect. 
B. JUDICIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE GENERAL LAW 
Nevertheless, to say that the common law of a state would 
apply under section 34 said little about whether a state's latest 
judicial decisions would necessarily supply an authoritative ex-
position of that state's common law. As another federal court 
41. Id. at 83-84. 
42. Iredell had made similar arguments elsewhere. In a South Carolina grand jury 
charge for a federal common law prosecution, he stated that the law of nations was "in 
full force in this state" because of the state's reception of the common law, and thus 
could supply the relevant rule of decision under section 34. See Justice Iredell's Charge to 
the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1794), in 
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-
1800, at 454, 468--69 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) (1985); see also Palmer, supra note 17, at 
299-301 (arguing that Iredell relied on state law to supply the rule of decision for certain 
federal common law crimes). Similarly, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 
(1793), Iredell urged in dissent that, absent congressional legislation, the State of Georgia 
should be immune in a suit for assumpsit brought by an individual, unless something "pe-
culiar" to the law of Georgia allowed for it, or if principles "common to all the States" 
(including, presumably, Georgia), did so. !d. at 434-35 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
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put it a few years after Mundell, even if the "laws" referred to in 
section 34 included the common law of a given state, "it will not 
be contended that we are bound by the opinions of the state 
courts on common law points, unless their decisions have been 
ancient, universal and without variation-so as to truly consti-
tute the law of the land. "43 
Mundell is not altogether clear about the extent to which a 
given state's decisional law might play a role settling the mean-
ing of, or departing from its previously adopted common law. 
For Iredell, states could readily depart from English common 
law by passing a statute.44 And he acknowledged that a state's 
judiciary might be able to depart from English common law, at 
least to the extent that its judiciary might conclude that the 
common law was not suited to a state's "new situation." But 
unlike the ease with which a state might legislatively depart from 
such common law, Iredell's analysis suggests that a state's judi-
cial departure from its pre-existing or received common law 
would not be easy. Iredell had justified the state's reception of 
the common law as an exercise in popular sovereignty,45 to be 
undone only in a comparable manner by the people or by its rep-
resentatives exercising their delegated authority. 
Iredell's reluctance to acknowledge easy judicial departure 
is, of course, consistent with an older, discovery-oriented view of 
common-law decisionmaking that was still prevalent in the late 
Eighteenth Century.46 Instances of judicial articulation and 
elaboration of the common law would not readily have been 
perceived as lawmaking or as necessarily involving change in the 
law. Although such a view tends to slight state decisional law as 
dispositive evidence of the meaning of a state's common law, it is 
in rough harmony with Justice Story's later recognition in Swift 
v. Tyson that judicial opinions are not laws, but only some "evi-
dence" of what the laws are.47 In addition, Iredell's division of 
43. United States v. Conyngham, 25 F. Cas. 599,601 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (14,850). 
44. "The [received] common and statute law of Virginia ... (is] repealable in the 
very same manner as any special act of the Virginia assembly." Mundell, 27 F. Cas. at 29. 
The Virginia reception provision actually purported to make legislative change the only 
mechanism for alteration in the received common law. See supra note 31. 
45. See William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Re-
view, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329, 332 n.l9 (1995) (citing Mundell as illustrative of Iredell's 
views on popular sovereignty). 
46. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1780-1860, at 245 (1977) (arguing that Swift's "declaratory" theory of the common law 
was reflective of eighteenth-century understandings about the nature of law, but that it 
was in sharp decline even as Justice Story (re)articulated it in 1842). 
47. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
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the common law into (1) a common law shared with other states 
and (2) a common law more uniquely a state's own, echoes the 
"general law" versus "local law" dichotomy of Swift. 48 With re-
spect to the judicial elaboration of the shared or general part of 
the common law, federal courts would presumably be engaged in 
the same interpretive exercise as would the state courts. But with 
respect to the more unique or local part, the federal courts were 
presumably more constrained. 
Mundell's correspondence with Swift, however, is not per-
fect. Swift seemed to suppose that the general commercial law 
which it applied was neither state nor federal in character.49 It 
thus appeared to read section 34 as inapplicable in such cases, 
concluding that the apply-state-law command of section 34 was 
operative only when "local" law was applicable. Indeed, this is 
how William Fletcher has described early understandings of sec-
tion 34 more generally.50 If it is correct to read Swift as havinR 
concluded that such general law operated outside of state law, 
then the decision appears to leave little room for a particular 
state's judicial departures from the general commercial law ever 
to be binding on the federal courts, even when the departure be-
carne clear and settled. Perhaps such an analysis could have been 
limited to law that was more multinational in character (such as 
the law merchant at issue in Swift); but it appears to have been 
applied outside of such areas, certainly in the wake of Swift52 if 
not before. And in Swift itself, Justice Story independently con-
strued the general commercial law even on the assumption that 
48. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1516-18 (noting the prevalence of the local 
law/general law dichotomy prior to Swift). 
49. See MICHAEL CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ECONOMY 138-40, 146-
47 (1991) (suggesting that section 34 was inapplicable to cases involving "the law mer-
chant" because of its international character). Alternatively, one might say that section 
34 was applicable in Swift, but that section 34's limit on the application of "state laws" to 
cases "where they apply" just meant that state laws were inapplicable. 
50. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1516-18; 1527-28 (arguing that section 34's refer-
ence to state "laws" was widely understood to implicate only local law, and that general 
law was neither local nor federal law). Fletcher's emphasis was on the continuity of Swift 
with earlier decisional law, to counter suggestions that Swift was somehow aberrational. 
51. See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. It is not clear from Swift itself whether Story 
was saying that he was ultimately applying New York law (regarding which New York 
decisional law was evidence), or something else altogether. See John Harrison, The 
Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 526 (2000) (noting 
that Swift sometimes appears to view the general law as operating outside of state law). 
52. See TONY ALLEN FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE 
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 45-75 (1981) (chronicling Swift's "expansion" into 
noncommercial areas). 
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state decisional law had "fully settled"53 the point in question dif-
ferently. 
Iredell, however, had stated that section 34 would require 
reference to state law "as well in cases of general and local con-
cern. "54 And he expressly indicated that the shared or general 
common law was ultimately state law, not something apart from 
it. The view that the general common law applied in federal 
courts under section 34 was in fact state law was one that had 
some pre-Swift adherents,55 but it seemed to become prominent 
only in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century.56 Iredell also 
indicated that states might depart from the general common law 
when it did not suit their circumstances, indicating that state 
courts might identify such departures. His approach therefore 
appears to leave open the possibility for federal courts to incor-
porate (under section 34) a state's clear judicial departures from 
the once-shared general law, in a way that Swift arguably does 
not.57 But because Mundell did not deal with such a situation, 
one can only speculate how Iredell might have handled the pros-
pect. 
C. STATE LAW AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL LITIGATION 
Finally, the Mundell opinion is significant insofar as it deals 
with an example of what today would implicate a question of 
53. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
54. See supra text at note 24. 
55. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,687-91 (1834) (Thompson and 
Baldwin, JJ., dissenting) (indicating that the common law, as received by a state, could 
supply the rule of decision in a federal copyright case in that state, without implicating 
any "common law of the United States" (whose existence the majority denied)); United 
States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (Chase, Circuit Justice) 
("(T]he common law of England, is the law of each state, so far as each state has adopted 
it; and it results from that position, connected with the Judicial act, that the common law 
will always apply to suits between citizen and citizen, whether they are instituted in a 
Federal, or State, Court."); see also FREYER, supra note 52, at 28. 
56. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 136 
(1898) (stating that federal court decisions on matters of general jurisprudence are "un-
controlled" by state court decisions, "(b]ut the law to be applied is none the less the Jaw 
of the State" (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1888))); see also Alfred 
Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1026-27 & n.59 (1953) 
(gathering similar authority from same era); cf FREYER, supra note 52, at 71-75 (noting 
late-nineteenth century debate over the source of the general common law applied by the 
federal courts). 
57. On the other hand, even for Iredell, commercial law might have been a category 
unto itself in multistate transactions like that in Swift and perhaps less subject to state 
judicial change; and for Story, it might have been possible for a persistent line of state 
deciSIOns to render "local" what was formerly "general." If so, perhaps their two ap-
proaches converge. 
176 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:163 
federal common law. That is, in civil suits by the United States, 
post-Erie federal courts have sometimes developed genuinely 
federal common law when Congress could have enacted the 
relevant rule of decision, but for one reason or another, did not 
do so. In fashioning federal common law, a court might construct 
a uniform rule based on general law principles, or adopt the law 
of the relevant state, thus opting for a non-uniform federal rule. 
But so characterized, a state's law is said to be operating not of 
its own force, but by presumed congressional choice. 58 
Iredell probably did not see it that way. He acknowledges 
that Congress has unexercised regulatory power in this setting, 
but he seems to regard state law as continuing to operate of its 
own force until it is displaced by a federal statute, a treaty, or the 
Constitution. Iredell's implication that section 34 reinforced the 
constitutional structure-that state law governs unless displaced 
by one of the three types of supreme federal law- is hard to 
miss. On the other hand, his suggestion that the first Congress 
might have found it preferable in a new republic "to rely on ex-
isting rules of decision" could indicate that Iredell viewed sec-
tion 34 as a gap-filler in which Congress affirmatively chose state 
law as the interim measure of federal law, at least in those areas 
that Congress might properly reach (as in Mundell itself). 
But Iredell's reluctance to look elsewhere than to state law 
to fashion a rule of decision for the federal government, even in 
an area of conceded federal competence, seems inconsistent with 
any suggestion-hotly contested at the time-that the common 
law had somehow been received as federal law at the federal 
level in the same way that it had been received as state law at the 
state level.59 Instead, Iredell seems to suppose that the common 
law available as a decisional rule for federal courts was that of a 
particular state rather than "the common law" in the abstract.60 
58. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 
685-704. 
59. In the mid-1790's, there was a much voiced fear (largely stemming from prose-
cutions for federal common law crimes) that the common law might be federal law and 
that Congress would have broad legislative powers coterminous with it. See Stewart Jay, 
Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1011, 1083-93 
(1985). Although Iredell signed on to some of those common law prosecutions, Robert 
Palmer has suggested that Iredell relied on relevant state common law to supply the rule 
of decision-not on "the common law" divorced from state law, nor on "federal" com-
mon law. See Palmer, supra note 17, at 299-301; cf DUPONCEAU, supra note 17, at 101-
02 (indicating that a "national" but nonfederal common law might have applied in many 
such cases). 
60. See also 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. 380 
(1803) (recounting parade of horribles were the common law understood to be part of 
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Iredell closed his opinion in Mundell by criticizing the absence of 
a uniform rule from Congress, and lamenting the fact that "a 
man guilty of a most daring violation of the peace of the country, 
and an inhuman assault upon an innocent and meritorious offi-
cer, should escape punishment proportioned to his offence. "61 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in United States v. Mundell is strong early con-
stitutional and statutory authority for the application of a par-
ticular state's statutory and common law in civil litigation in the 
federal courts-even in litigation brought by the United States. 
At the same time, the decision appears to assume that a state's 
pre-existing common law consists of elements that would be 
widely shared by other states, and that federal courts would be 
called upon to interpret and apply this largely uniform general 
law under Section 34. Iredell's focus on the states' reception of 
the common law also provides a positive law basis for applica-
tion of the general law by state courts and by federal courts ap-
plying state law. In addition, Mundell's implication that a state's 
inherited common law is not easily altered by state judicial deci-
sionmaking is consistent with an independent role for federal 
courts in the interpretation and administration of a state's pre-
existing common law, at least until that law becomes settled oth-
erwise. 
For some, the fighting issue surrounding section 34 has in-
volved the "statutory" versus "common law" distinction high-
lighted in Erie; and for other<: it has been the "local" versus 
"general" distinction highlighted by Swift. But Iredell's approach 
to state law-which appears to treat even the general or shared 
common law as a species of state law from which states might 
depart-highlighted but did not resolve a different yet related 
question: At what point could a state's judicial elaboration of its 
general common law become binding on the federal courts? In 
the decades following Swift, the answer to that question seemed 
to be, if not "never," then "hardly ever." That, in turn, would 
give rise to what became a long smoldering federalism-based 
challenge to Swift-a challenge that might have been blunted 
under an approach which seemed to recognize that even the 
federal law as opposed to the law of each state). 
61. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. at 32. 
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more general common law was genuinely state law, and as such, 
not altogether immune from state judicial alteration. 62 
62 See, e.g .• Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, passim (1892) 
(Field, 1., dissenting) (denying federal courts "an independent judgment" regarding state 
common law when the law of the state has been "settled" by "repeated adjudications," 
but allowing such independent judgment when state law was "unsettled"). 
